Workshop on Principles of Secure Compilation
Secure compilation is an emerging field that puts together advances in security, programming languages, compilers, verification, systems, and hardware architectures in order to devise more secure compilation chains that eliminate many of today’s security vulnerabilities and that allow sound reasoning about security properties in the source language. For a concrete example, all modern languages provide a notion of structured control flow and an invoked procedure is expected to return to the right place. However, today’s compilation chains (compilers, linkers, loaders, runtime systems, hardware) cannot efficiently enforce this abstraction against linked low-level code, which can call and return to arbitrary instructions or smash the stack, blatantly violating the high-level abstraction. Other problems arise because today’s languages fail to specify security policies, such as data confidentiality, and the compilation chains thus fail to enforce them, especially against powerful side-channel attacks. The emerging secure compilation community aims to address such problems by identifying precise security goals and attacker models, designing more secure languages, devising efficient enforcement and mitigation mechanisms, and developing effective verification techniques for secure compilation chains.
The goal of this workshop is to identify interesting research directions and open challenges and to bring together researchers interested in working on building secure compilation chains, on developing proof techniques and verification tools, and on designing software or hardware enforcement mechanisms for secure compilation.
Format
PriSC is an informal workshop without any proceedings. Anyone interested in presenting at the workshop will submit an extended abstract (up to 2 pages), and the PC will decide which talks to accept based on a lightweight review process. We will also run a short talks session, where participants get 5 minutes to present intriguing ideas and advertise ongoing work.
Past editions (all collocated with POPL)
- PriSC 2022, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA, January 22, 2021
- PriSC 2021, Online, January 17, 2021
- PriSC 2020, New Orleans, Louisiana, USA, January 25, 2020
- PriSC 2019, Cascais/Lisbon, Portugal, January 13, 2019
- PriSC 2018, Los Angeles, USA, January 13, 2018
- Secure Compilation Meeting, Paris, France, January 15, 2017
Sat 21 JanDisplayed time zone: Eastern Time (US & Canada) change
09:00 - 10:30 | |||
09:00 5mDay opening | Introduction PriSC | ||
09:05 60mKeynote | Semantic Intermediate Representations for Sound Language Interoperability PriSC Amal Ahmed Northeastern University, USA Pre-print | ||
10:05 25mTalk | Towards End-to-End Verified TEEs via Verified Interface Conformance and Interface-Preserving Compilers PriSC Farzaneh Derakhshan Carnegie Mellon University, Zichao Zhang Carnegie Mellon University, Amit Vasudevan Carnegie Mellon University, Limin Jia Carnegie Mellon University File Attached |
11:00 - 12:30 | |||
11:00 25mTalk | Automated Learning and Verification of Embedded Security Architectures PriSC Matteo Busi University Ca' Foscari, Venice, Riccardo Focardi University Ca' Foscari, Venice, Flaminia L. Luccio University Ca' Foscari, Venice File Attached | ||
11:25 25mTalk | pi_RA: A pi-calculus for verifying protocols that use remote attestation PriSC File Attached | ||
11:50 25mTalk | Robust Constant-Time Cryptography PriSC Matthew Kolosick University of California at San Diego, Basavesh Ammanaghatta Shivakumar Max Planck Institute for Security and Privacy (MPI-SP), Sunjay Cauligi University of California at San Diego, USA, Marco Patrignani University of Trento, Marco Vassena Utrecht University, Ranjit Jhala University of California at San Diego, Deian Stefan University of California at San Diego Pre-print | ||
12:15 15mTalk | Short Talk: Generalising secure compilation criteria PriSC Emiel Lanckriet KU Leuven |
14:00 - 15:30 | |||
14:00 25mTalk | Blame-Preserving Secure Compilation PriSC Marco Patrignani University of Trento, Matthis Kruse CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security Pre-print | ||
14:25 25mTalk | Securely Compiling F* Programs With IO and Then Linking Them Against Weakly-Typed InterfacesRecorded PriSC Pre-print File Attached | ||
14:50 25mTalk | SECOMP2CHERI: Securely Compiling Compartments from CompCert C to a Capability Machine PriSC Jérémy Thibault MPI-SP, Arthur Azevedo de Amorim Boston University, Roberto Blanco MPI-SP, Aina Linn Georges Aarhus University, Cătălin Hriţcu MPI-SP, Andrew Tolmach Portland State University Pre-print Media Attached File Attached |
16:00 - 17:30 | |||
16:00 25mTalk | Cachet: A Domain-Specific Language for Trustworthy Just-In-Time Compilers PriSC Michael Smith UC San Diego, Abhishek Sharma UC San Diego, John Renner University of California at San Diego, USA, David Thien UC San Diego, Sorin Lerner University of California at San Diego, Fraser Brown CMU, Hovav Shacham University of Texas at Austin, Deian Stefan University of California at San Diego File Attached | ||
16:25 25mTalk | FaJITa: Verifying Optimizations on Just-In-Time Programs PriSC David Thien UC San Diego, Michael Smith UC San Diego, Evan Johnson University of California at San Diego; Arm, Sorin Lerner University of California at San Diego, Hovav Shacham University of Texas at Austin, Deian Stefan University of California at San Diego, Fraser Brown CMU Pre-print File Attached | ||
16:50 25mTalk | Universally Composable Security for Program Partitioning PriSC Coşku Acay Cornell University, Joshua Gancher Carnegie Mellon University, Rolph Recto Cornell University, Andrew Myers Cornell University File Attached |
Accepted Papers
Call for Presentations
Secure compilation is an emerging field that puts together advances in security, programming languages, compilers, verification, systems, and hardware architectures in order to devise more secure compilation chains that eliminate many of today’s security vulnerabilities and that allow sound reasoning about security properties in the source language. For a concrete example, all modern languages provide a notion of structured control flow and an invoked procedure is expected to return to the right place. However, today’s compilation chains (compilers, linkers, loaders, runtime systems, hardware) cannot efficiently enforce this abstraction against linked low-level code, which can call and return to arbitrary instructions or smash the stack, blatantly violating the high-level abstraction. Other problems arise because today’s languages fail to specify security policies, such as data confidentiality, and the compilation chains thus fail to enforce them, especially against powerful side-channel attacks. The emerging secure compilation community aims to address such problems by identifying precise security goals and attacker models, designing more secure languages, devising efficient enforcement and mitigation mechanisms, and developing effective verification techniques for secure compilation chains.
The goal of this workshop is to identify interesting research directions and open challenges and to bring together researchers interested in working on building secure compilation chains, on developing proof techniques and verification tools, and on designing software or hardware enforcement mechanisms for secure compilation.
7th Workshop on Principles of Secure Compilation (PriSC 2023)
The Workshop on Principles of Secure Compilation (PriSC) is an informal 1-day workshop without any proceedings. The goal is to bring together researchers interested in secure compilation and to identify interesting research directions and open challenges. The 7th edition of PriSC will be held on January 21, 2023 in Boston, Massachusetts, United State together with the ACM SIGPLAN Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages (POPL).
Presentation Proposals and Attending the Workshop
Anyone interested in presenting at the workshop should submit an extended abstract (up to 2 pages, details below) covering past, ongoing, or future work. Any topic that could be of interest to secure compilation is in scope. Secure compilation should be interpreted very broadly to include any work in security, programming languages, architecture, systems or their combination that can be leveraged to preserve security properties of programs when they are compiled or to eliminate low-level vulnerabilities. Presentations that provide a useful outside view or challenge the community are also welcome. This includes presentations on new attack vectors such as microarchitectural side-channels, whose defenses could benefit from compiler techniques.
Specific topics of interest include but are not limited to:
-
Attacker models for secure compiler chains.
-
Secure compiler properties: fully abstract compilation and similar properties, memory safety, control-flow integrity, preservation of safety, information flow and other (hyper-)properties against adversarial contexts, secure multi-language interoperability.
-
Secure interaction between different programming languages: foreign function interfaces, gradual types, securely combining different memory management strategies.
-
Enforcement mechanisms and low-level security primitives: static checking, program verification, typed assembly languages, reference monitoring, program rewriting, software-based isolation/hiding techniques (SFI, crypto-based, randomization-based, OS/hypervisor-based), security-oriented architectural features such as Intel’s SGX, MPX and MPK, capability machines, side-channel defenses, object capabilities.
-
Experimental evaluation and applications of secure compilers.
-
Proof methods relevant to compilation: (bi)simulation, logical relations, game semantics, trace semantics, multi-language semantics, embedded interpreters.
-
Formal verification of secure compilation chains (protection mechanisms, compilers, linkers, loaders), machine-checked proofs, translation validation, property-based testing.
Guidelines for Submitting Extended Abstracts
Extended abstracts should be submitted in PDF format and not exceed 2 pages (references not included). They should be formatted in two-column layout, 10pt font, and be printable on A4 and US Letter sized paper. We recommend using the new acmart LaTeX style in sigplan
mode. Submissions are not anonymous and should provide sufficient detail to be assessed by the program committee. Presentation at the workshop does not preclude publication elsewhere.
Contact and More Information
For questions please contact the workshop chairs, Marco Guarnieri and Shweta Shinde.